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UNIFORM STATE LEGISLATION THROUGH
INTERSTATE COMPACTS*
At the Forty-sixth Annual Conference of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, held
in Boston, August 17-22, 1936, the conference adopted an
amendment to its constitution, recommended by the execu-
tive committee, whereby the objectives of the conference have
been enlarged to include model acts on "(a) subjects suit-
able for interstate compacts, and (b) subjects in which uni-
formity will make more effective the exercise of state powers
and promote interstate cooperation." This amendment there-
fore means that in the future the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws will consider model
laws to become valid by interstate cooperation under the
sanction and approval of Congress. The enlarged scope of the
work of the Conference will mean the exercise of powers and
prerogatives conferred jointly upon the several states and
the Congress by virtue of Article 1, Section 10, of the Con-
stitution of the United States, which reads as follows:
"No state shall, without the consent of Congress.. . enter into any
agreement or compact with another state."
During the presidential campaign just closed, one of the
chief issues consisted in the enlarged demands upon Congress
for remedial legislation in times of economic stress. The
charge was frequently made that the President, through his
advocacy and approval of such measures as the National
Industrial Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
and others, had undertaken to destroy the fundamental con-
ception of the American government, and the question was
raised as to whether or not further amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States was necessary in order to car-
*Since writing the foregoing, the Federal Trade Commission, on January 4,
recommended the creation of a federal board to promote compacts between con-
tigious states for milk control, with a view to prevent unfair trade practices
found to exist in some instances.
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ry through measures for the relief of labor and industry and
in order to avoid the awful consequences of depressive busi-
ness conditions.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, avowedly with no political design, enlarged the
scope of its work to consider model acts whereby the several
states in the Union, through concerted action and with the
approval of Congress, may attain some of the objectives
which the Federal Government itself, under the limitations
of the Constitution, could not have accomplished. For ex-
ample, upon the question of laws relating to hours, condi-
tions, and compensation of labor, a group of New England
states, facing similar problems of supply and demand, may
wish to establish uniform laws that would have no applica-
tion in other sections of the country. The Federal Govern-
ment, limited as it is by the Constitution, is powerless to act
in matters which strictly affect intrastate business and can-
not provide the needed legislation; but the several states af-
fected by these conditions can provide the necessary legis-
lation and by compact between themselves, with the approv-
al of Congress, can mutually enforce such laws.
This new undertaking on the part of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws enters the
experimental field, and may furnish a new "out" in the con-
troversy over whether measures for social and economic re-
lief must be provided by the Federal Government or by the
several states themselves by independent and unrelated legis-
lative action. This new venture by state compacts means the
application of an old principle for a new purpose.
An examination of congressional enactments reveals that
the employment of interstate compacts, with congressional
approval, has been resorted to since the very early days of
the Republic. One of the first joint resolutions of Congress
was drafted May 12, 1820,' which ratified an agreement be-
1 3 STAT. 609, V.
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tween Kentucky and Tennessee to adjust and establish a
boundary line between the two states. Similar acts have been
passed affecting New York and New Jersey,2 Missouri and
Arkansas,8 Massachusetts and Rhode Island,4 Virginia and
West Virginia,' New York and Vermont,' New York and
Connecticut,' Connecticut and Rhode Island,' New York
and Pennsylvania,9 and other states. Concurrent legislation,
affecting fisheries, has been the subject of interstate com-
pacts under congressional legislation, notably the case of
Delaware and New Jersey.10 The question of criminal juris-
diction upon the Mississippi River was the object of a com-
pact between Mississippi and Arkansas by the Act of Janu-
ary 26, 1909.11 The conservation of forests and water sup-
ply by the several states was provided for in an Act of March
1, 1911.12 Minnesota, North and South Dakota, entered into
an agreement for the control of floods on boundary waters
and tributaries, sanctioned by Congress on August 8, 1917.13
Fish in the Columbia River were protected by compact be-
tween Oregon and Washington under the Act of April 8,
1918.14 On July 11, 1919,1" New York and New Jersey en-
tered into a compact with Congressional approval providing
for the construction of the Hudson River tunnel. The Boul-
der Canyon Project, the result of a compact between the
states affected thereby, was sanctioned by the Act of August
19, 1921.16 The development of the Port of New York Au-
2 4 STAT. 708-711.
8 9 STAT. 211, c. 10.
4 11 STAT. 382, c. 28.
5 14 STAT. 350, No. 12.
6 21 STAT. 72, C. 49.
7 21 STAT. 351-352.
8 25 STAT. 552, c. 1094.
9 26 STAT. 329-333.
10 34 STAT. 858-861.
i 35 STAT. 1161, No. 5.
12 36 STAT. 961, C. 186, 1.
18 40 STAT. 266, 5.
14 40 STAT. 515, c. 47.
15 40 STAT. 158, c. 11.
16 42 STAT. 171, c. 72.
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thority was made possible through a joint resolution of Con-
gress August 23, 192 1.11 Even exemption of municipal water
works from taxation was made possible through a compact
between Kansas and Missouri, approved by joint resolution
of Congress."s The apportionment 9 of water supply of the
Columbia River was made possible by a similar exercise of
power contained in the Constitution of the United States.
The construction of a bridge over the Menominee River was
made possible through the joint action of Wisconsin and
Michigan, with the approval of Congress.2" Numerous other
compacts have been entered into between different states
with the aid of Congress, whereby similar legislation has
been sanctioned.
In this connection notice may be taken of the half-way
cases in which the United States has negotiated with in-
dividual states. Thus, by the Act of March 21, 1934,21 Con-
gress provided for a commissioner to act in conjunction with
a commissioner on the part of Virginia and a third selected
by these two in determining the District of Columbia-Vir-
ginia boundary, the recommendations of the commissioners
to be subject to ratification by Congress and Virginia.
According to a memorandum on interstate compacts, pre-
pared by the legislative reference service of the Library of
Congress, furnished by the Law Librarian, John Vance, a
still different situation occurred in the case of Virginia and
Kentucky. By an Act of December 18, 1789, Virginia au-
thorized the erection of the District of Kentucky into a
new state. That Act provided that "all private rights and
interests of lands within the said district, derived from the
laws of Virginia, shall remain valid and secure under the
laws of the proposed state, and shall be determined by the
laws now existing in this state." This Compact was ratified
1T 42 STAT. 174-180.
18 43 STAT. 1058.
19 43 STAT. 1268, c. 534.
20 45 STAT. 3- 303.
21 48 STAT. 453, C. 72.
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by the convention which framed the Constitution of Ken-
tucky and was incorporated into that Constitution. The Act
of Congress for the admission of Kentucky 2 contained no
express reference to the subject; and in Green v. Biddle 2 3
it was argued that the Compact was invalid because made
without the consent of Congress, contrary to the provision
of Article 1, Section 10, of the Federal Constitution. But the
Supreme Court, after observing that the Constitution "makes
no provision respecting the mode or form in which the con-
sent of Congress is to be signified" and that the question in
such cases is, "Has Congress, by some positive act, in rela-
tion to such agreement, signified the consent of that body
to its validity?" found in the preamble to the Act of 1791,
with its reference to the Act of Virginia of 1789 and the Con-
vention in Kentucky, sufficient indication, under the circum-
stances, of an assent to the terms of separation set out in
the Virginia proposal, including the "Compact" in question.
As late as June 8, 1936, a compact between fourteen states
was approved by Congress to conserve and regulate the flow
of and purify the waters of rivers and streams whose drain-
age basins were within two or more of the states of Maine,
New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and other states.24
In State of Virginia v. State of Tennessee 25 the Supreme
Court of the United States was called upon to establish by
judicial decree the true boundary line between the states
of Virginia and Tennessee. The states themselves had under-
taken to establish and fix these boundaries by legislative ac-
tion and the question involved was whether or not the ac-
tion of the two states required congressional approval. In
undertaking to distinguish between "compact" and "agree-
ment" the Court held that the mere selection of parties to
run and designate the boundary line between two states, or
22 1 STAT. 189 (Feb. 4, 1791).
28 8 Wheat. 1 (1823).
24 Pub. Res. 104, H. J. Res. 377, 74th Cong., 2nd Sews., 80 CoNG. R=o 9228
(1936).
25 148 U. S. 503 (1893).
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to designate what line should be run, of itself imports no
agreement to accept the line run by them, and such action
of itself does not come within the prohibition of the Federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court said:
"It is a legislative declaration which the state and individuals af-
fected by the recognized boundary line may invoke against the state
as an admission, but not as a compact or agreement."
However,
"If the boundary established is so run as to cut off an important
and valuable portion of a state, the political power of the state en-
larged would be affected by the settlement of the boundary; and to an
agreement for the running of such a boundary or rather for its adop-
tion afterwards, the consent of congress may well be required."
In other words, the approval of Congress under Article I,
Section 10, of the Constitution, is required if the political
power of any state or of the Federal Government is involved.
As definitive of this power of states and Congress by joint
action, the Supreme Court has held that the wishes of Con-
gress may as well be given after the states have acted, as
before, and in State of Virginia v. State of Tennessee said
that "the consent of Congress could not have preceded the
execution of the compact, for until the line was run it could
not be known where it would lie and whether or not it would
receive the approval of the states." The Court, in this case,
further held that the approval of Congress to a compact
might be fairly implied through its subsequent legislation
and proceedings.
The Supreme Court has clearly set forth that compacts
or agreements between states affecting the political power
of the United States require congressional approval.26
In order for congressional approval to be required, the
compact or agreement must encroach upon or interfere with
the supremacy of the United States." A compact made by
two states in the manner permitted or prescribed by the
26 Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155 (1894).
27 Wharton v. Wise, op. cit. supra note 26.
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Federal Constitution is a law and is binding on the citizens
of both states.2"
Such an agreement is within the constitutional prohibition
of the impairment of the obligation of contracts.29 Congress
has the power to enforce any interstate compact to which
it has assented? °
To what extent, if any, the several states will avail them-
selves of model laws, which the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws will provide, cannot be
anticipated. The far-flung operations of commerce and in-
dustry have provoked repeated demands for federal legisla-
tion and even amendments to the Federal Constitution may
be required to validate such legislation. It may be consid-
ered that if legislation amongst groups of states to relieve
conditions adversely affecting them and not the country at
large will supply the needs of these modern times without
amendment of the basic law of the land, resort will be made
to interstate compacts and the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws may become increasingly
important and influential in framing needed legislation.
At the moment a new experimental use of an old consti-
tutional provision is imminent and the country at large
watches with interest this experiment in the legislative field.
Herbert U. Feibelman.
Miami, Florida.
28 Poole v. The Lessee of Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185 (1837).
29 Greene v. Biddle, op. cit. supra note 23.
30 Commonwealth of Virginia v. State of West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565 (1918).
